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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS
Upstream – Federal
6th Cir.
Encana Oil & Gas (USA) Inc. v. Zaremba Family Farms, Inc., 16-2065/171429, 2018 WL 2446698 (6th Cir. May 31, 2018).
Oil Operator sued Mineral Owner, seeking the return of $1.8 million of the
$2 million that had been exchanged upon the agreement between the parties
to negotiate a binding lease agreement. Because the intended agreement
between Oil Operator and Mineral Owner failed to come to fruition, Oil
Operator requested the $1.8 million and subsequently sued Mineral Owner
for breach of contract. Contrary to the unquestioned prior agreement
between the parties, an employee of Oil Operator mistakenly told Mineral
Owner that it could keep the entirety of the $2 million. After this dispute
arose, Oil Operator was accused of violating the Sherman Antitrust Act and
the Michigan Antirust Act by working with other operators to avoid bidding
wars over lease prices in Michigan. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that Mineral Owner failed to prove the antirust conspiracy and
ordered the return of the $1.8 million. Despite Oil Operator employee’s
mistaken communication, the appellate court held that the communication
did not rise to the level of a contract waiver since, under Michigan law, a
waiver requires consideration.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
D. New Mexico
Cibola Energy Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Interior, No. 12-cv-1099 MCA/LFG,
2018 WL 2337137 (D.N.M. May 23, 2018).
Operator appealed Bureau’s decision, alleging that Bureau acted arbitrarily
and capriciously when it ordered Operator to conduct production tests on a
well after Operator applied for the well to be assigned “temporarily
abandoned” status. The well was completed in 1990 and never produced. It
was last tested for production in 1990, and the test indicated that production
was “marginal.” In 2011, Operator applied for a “temporarily abandoned”
status to the well in order to maintain the lease on the well’s land. Bureau
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determined that even if a well is not producing, it must be capable of
producing in paying qualities to avoid termination of the lease. The phrase
“capable of production” means a well that is actually in a condition to
produce at the particular time in question. Operator sought to rely on the
1990 test to prove this “capable of production” status, but Bureau ordered
new testing to determine whether there were unknown changed conditions
in order to decide whether to extend the leases. The district court held that
this new data was necessary to determine the current status of the well.
Therefore, it was not arbitrary or capricious to order new production tests,
and the court upheld Bureau’s decision.
Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, No. CIV–15–0209
JB/SCY, 2018 WL 1940992 (D.N.M. Apr. 23, 2018).
Environmental Organization filed suit against Government Entities for
violating the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) by failing to
consult with particular affected parties before approving drilling permits for
Third Party Drilling Company. After the trial court denied Environmental
Organization’s motion for preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of
Government Entities’ authorization of drilling permits, and the subsequent
affirmation by an appellate judge, Environmental Organization filed for a
review on the merits and a permanent injunction. The United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico found that: (1) Environmental
Organization’s allegations of an increased environmental risk and aesthetic
injury were concrete enough injuries to constitute standing and were fairly
traceable to Government Entities’ alleged failure to adhere to the NEPA;
(2) Government Entities’ analysis of the potential impacts of the drilling
was proper and complied with the NEPA; (3) Government Entities
complied with the NEPA’s requirement for public involvement by placing
information about the proposed wells on its website, along with extending
invitations to the public to meetings regarding the wells; (4) Government
Entities’ delay in furnishing its environmental assessments did not violate
the NEPA because the assessments were available “promptly upon
request”; (5) the location and potential impacts of the drilling did not
require Government Entities to perform any further notification or
consultation, because it would not adversely impact the groups in question;
and (6) even if the alleged harm did occur, a preliminary injunction would
be the improper remedy because “the presumption favors vacatur and, in
this case, vacatur more properly addresses the harm.” For those reasons, the
court denied Environmental Organization’s request for review and
injunction and dismissed the claims with prejudice.
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This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher
court as of publication.
N.D. Ohio
Kerns v. Chesapeake Expl., LLC, No. 5:18 CV 389, 2018 WL 2952662
(N.D. Ohio June 13, 2018).
Property Owners filed suit against Operator and Ohio Department of
Natural Resources (“ODNR”) for due process violations regarding the
taking of Property Owners’ mineral interests after Operator commenced
horizontal drilling, which obtained oil and gas from underneath Property
Owners’ land. The district court found that: (1) regardless of whether
Property Owners actually held the mineral interests in question, they had
standing to bring suit because their allegations encompassed claims that
Operator’s actions also interfered with the use of the surface land; (2)
because Operator would not have been subject to the state’s required
mandamus action for such a complaint, Property Owners’ failure to utilize
that avenue for compensation did not prevent this case from being ripe for
review; (3) because Property Owners could not adequately allege that
Operator was acting under the color of state law in a fashion that made it a
state actor, their claims for violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments should be dismissed; (4) because Property Owners’ suit
alleged an ongoing violation of federal law and also sought prospective
relief, ODNR was not immune from suit via its status as a state actor; and
(5) the Ohio law authorizing the taking in question was not unconstitutional
because the state has a right to reduce waste when it comes to oil and gas.
For those reasons, the court found that Property Owners failed to state a
claim under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, and accordingly granted
Operator and ODNR’s Motions to Dismiss.
N.D. West Virginia
Packard v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 1:18CV04, 2018 WL 2348398 (N.D.
W.Va. May 23, 2018).
Lessors sued Lessee claiming that their oil and gas leases did not contain
pooling authorization, and, despite the lack of authorization, Lessee drilled
producing horizontal wells crossing through the Lessor’s three tracts of land
and pooled their minerals. Lessors claimed trespass, breach of contract, and
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breach of the implied duty to protect against drainage. The district court
determined that Lessors trespass claim was barred by West Virginia’s gist
of the action doctrine, which prevents the presentation of a contract issue as
a tort action. Because Lessors did not claim that Lessee could not enter the
property to drill, just that they could not pool, trespass was not appropriate.
Next, the court addressed the breach of contract claim and refused to
dismiss Lessor’s claim, finding that the leases did not contain the express
right to pool and that the law did not yet recognize an implied right to pool
as Lessee argued. Lastly, the court addressed the implied covenant to
protect against drainage and found that Lessors claims were without merit
because they were not alleging that Lessee was draining neighboring
property..
Bounty Minerals, LLC v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:17cv219, 2018 WL
2749598 (N.D.W. Va. June 7, 2018).
Lessor claimed that the oil and gas lease (“Lease”) with Lessee was
terminated for lack of production. Lessor’s complaint alleged lease
termination for lack of production, slander of title, breach of the implied
covenant to further explore, and breach of the implied covenant to further
develop. Lessee filed a motion to dismiss the claims by Lessor. The district
court found that: (1) because the Lease contained a flat rate or shut-in
royalty provision, under West Virginia law, whether or not the well was
producing was irrelevant, and Lessor’s request for Lease termination and
ejectment was denied; (2) regarding slander of title, because the Lease had
not been terminated, Lessee was not falsely claiming an interest on the
property, and accordingly, there was no slander of title; (3) in addressing
Lessor’s claim of failure by the Lessee to explore further, the court declined
to recognize the implied covenant, as no West Virginia court had done so
previously; and (4) Lessee had breached the covenant to develop even
though the lease was a flat-rate lease.
Upstream – State
Louisiana
Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury Res., Inc., 2017-997 (La. App. 3 Cir.
5/23/18); No. 17-997, 2018 WL 2326189.
Assignor appealed lower court’s award of legal interest on awarded
damages granted from the date of judicial demand to Lessors for Assignor’s
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breach of its duty to operate as a reasonably prudent operator by destroying
and preventing access to a gas reservoir. Prior to the lower court’s ruling,
Lessors had settled with Assignee for the breach of duty. Assignor claimed
that the lower court erred in finding them singularly liable since Lessors
lost revenue due to Assignees’ operations. Additionally, Assignor felt that
the lower court erred in calculating their share of the damages, as they
claimed Lessors released Assignor from liability by settling damages with
Assignees. The Court of Appeal of Louisiana agreed with the lower court
because the covenant to operate as a reasonably prudent operator is implied
in the lease, and therefore, Assignees and Assignors have equal portions of
liability. Additionally, Lessors claimed that the interest should have been
granted from the date of the breach rather than the date of the judgment.
Here, the court agreed and amended the lower court’s judgment to include
interest from the date of the judgment.
Ohio
Mid-Ohio Coal Co. v. Brown, No. 17 CA 21, 2018 WL 2254673, 2018Ohio-1934.
This case involves a dispute as to the proper ownership of a mineral estate.
Party-1 contended that Party-2 only owned the rights to subsurface coal,
while Party-2 claimed they owned the entire subsurface mineral estate
without limitation. The trial court found that Party-2 owned the entire
subsurface estate. Upon review, the Court of Appeals of Ohio agreed with
the lower court and held that the language of the deed granted the entire
subsurface mineral estate, not just the rights to coal.
Texas
Murphy Expl. & Prod. Co.–USA v. Adams, No. 16–0505, 2018 WL
2449313 (Tex. June 1, 2018).
Operator-1 sued Operator-2, seeking damages resulting from the alleged
breach of an oil and gas lease stemming from Lessee’s drilling of an offset
well based on the drilling of a mineral-producing well on adjacent land.
Operator-2 posited that the lease did not impose a requirement related to
distance and argued that, when the lease was contemplated, horizontal shale
wells were the focus and that minimal drainage existed in the shale
formation proximate to the well’s location. The Texas Supreme Court, in
reversing the lower court’s ruling in favor of Operator-1, held that the
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relevant locations in horizontal drilling are the perforated and fractured
regions of the horizontal wellbore. Additionally, the court held that the oil
and gas lease between Operator-1 and Operator-2 plainly detailed the
specific implications once the offset provision was triggered. Significantly,
the ruling reaffirms the standard instituted by courts in enforcing only what
is expressly defined in an oil lease regarding the contractual responsibilities
of both parties.
Neuhoff v. Piranha Partners, No. 07–16–00136–CV, 2018 WL 2223132
(Tex. App. May 15, 2018).
Assignor and Assignee disputed what property was actually conveyed in
Assignment of a properly recorded oil and gas lease. Assignor claimed that
Assignment only assigned their overriding royalty interest in a specific well
on their section of land to Assignee. Conversely, Assignee claimed that
what was assigned was actually an overriding royalty interest over
Assignor’s entire section. The trial court determined, through the records
and evidence, that the assignment covered the entire section not just a
specific well. In analyzing the lower court’s decision, the Court of Appeals
of Texas reviewed the assignments using standard principals of contract
construction. After analysis the appellate court found that the assignment
only meant to grant an interest in a quarter of the section to Assignee, not
the entire section or just the specific well.
TRO–X, L.P. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., No. 16–0412, 2018 WL
2372805 (Tex. May 25, 2018).
Assignor filed suit for breach of contract and trespass to try title, claiming
that back-in interest on assigned leases to Assignee were not paid.
However, the leases that were originally assigned were terminated by
Lessors due to a provision in the lease that required an offset well be drilled
if a well which was drilled within a certain distance from the boundary of
the leased property was produced in paying quantities. Assignee admittedly
failed to meet the provision of the assigned lease and the lease was
therefore terminated. Assignee then negotiated a new lease with Lessors on
the same property as the original and terminated leases. Assignee claimed
that the originally assigned leases were top leases and subject to the back-in
interest. The trial court agreed with Assignor, but the appellate court
reversed. Assignee then appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas. Upon
review, the Court set out to determine whether the second leases were
intended to be top leases. Only then could Assignors’ back-in interest still
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be valid. In analyzing top leases and intent, the Court noted that when a
new lease is executed on an existing lease by the same parties, the existing
lease is terminated, unless intent is expressly shown otherwise. Therefore,
the Court found that there was no indication that Lessors and Assignee
meant for the original leases to survive after the execution of the second
leases. As such, the original leases were terminated along with Assignor’s
back-in interest.
U.S. KingKing, LLC v. Precision Energy Servs., Inc., No. 01–17–00215–
CV, 2018 WL 2638648 (Tex. App. June 5, 2018).
Supplier entered into an agreement with Well Operator to supply oilfield
goods and services. When Well operator failed to pay invoices for labor and
materials used to drill an oil well, Supplier brought suit against Well
Operator for breach of contract, fraud, declaratory relief, and foreclosure of
a mineral lien. Well Operator attempted to pierce the corporate veil and
hold Supplier’s Parent Company liable for Supplier’s obligations under an
alter-ego theory. The district court found Parent Company jointly liable for
the unpaid invoices. Well Operator appealed. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals of Texas found that Supplier failed to establish, as a matter of law,
that either Well Operator or Parent Company acted with the intent to
deceive, nor did Supplier conclusively establish that the use of limited
liability was illegitimate or that Parent Company was attempting to use the
corporate structure to shield abuses like fraud. As a result, the appellate
court concluded that Parent Company was not an alter-ego of Well
Operator and, thus, could not be found jointly liable for the actions of Well
Operator.
Utah
J.P. Furlong Co. v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 2018 UT 22, No. 201550620,
2018 WL 2710963.
Non-Operator challenged an order from Board of Oil, Gas & Mining
(“Board”) in which it imposed a joint operating agreement (“JOA”) with
Operator who was operating the drilling unit in which Non-Operator’s lease
was included. Non-Operator claimed that the JOA was imposed upon it
without any modification to the Operator-proposed agreement. NonOperator felt that there was insufficient evidence to support Board’s
decision to support the imposition of the JOA. Non-Operator claimed that
Board did not give proper reasoning for the failure to adopt their proposed
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changed to the JOA. However, the Supreme Court of Utah ultimately found
that the adoption of the JOA without any of the Non-Operator proposed
changes was appropriate because the JOA was based on the model supplied
by the American Association of Professional Landmen (“AAPL”) form, and
industry standard was to adopt it without significant modification, just as
Board had imposed. The court held that there was nothing in the law that
required Board to balance the interests of the parties, to which a JOA was
being imposed, in the agreement.
Midstream – Federal
2d Cir.
Harry v. Total Gas & Power N. Am., Inc., 889 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2018).
Natural gas Investors (“Investors”) brought suit against traders of natural
gas (“Traders”) claiming monopolization and manipulation of natural gas
trading in violation of Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) and antitrust
laws. At trial, Traders motioned for dismissal claiming lack of standing and
failure to state a claim because Investors failed to allege possibility of
injury due to the fact that their own derivatives were not indexed under the
markets. The lower court found that there was no harm or intent, and
Investors thus failed to state a claim. Investors appealed. On appeal, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that while Investors had Article III
standing, they failed to state a claim under the CEA or antitrust laws
because it was not plausible on the record that they were injured by the
manipulations of Traders. Therefore, the court modified the order and
judgment to remove the dismissal for lack of standing and affirmed the
dismissal for failure to state a claim.
D.C. Cir.
City of Clarksville, Tennessee v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 888
F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
City is a municipality that operates natural gas services in Tennessee and
Kentucky, which filed an application with Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”) to determine its service area in 2013. Upon
inspection, FERC discovered that City delivered natural gas through a
pipeline to a city in Kentucky (“Alternate City”). Though FERC determined
that City’s provision of natural gas to Alternate City was permissible under
a previous certificate, it informed City that further transport across state
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lines would require an entirely different certificate. City claimed that it did
not require this certification due to its classification of municipality as
defined by the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”) and that FERC, therefore, did not
have jurisdiction over City. FERC disputed this claim, although it agreed to
issue City a special certificate to provide Alternate City with natural gas
due to the long-time arrangement and Alternate City’s reliance on it. City
appealed FERC’s determination that it maintained jurisdiction over City
and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found that City indeed had standing
to challenge FERC’s orders, and further, that FERC lacked authority under
the NGA to regulate a municipality’s natural gas sales.
Midstream – State
Texas
Morello v. Seaway Crude Pipeline Co., No. 01–16–00765–CV, 2018 WL
2305541 (Tex. App. May 22, 2018).
Property Owner filed suit against Pipeline Company to object to Pipeline
Company’s planned pipeline through property he owned. The trial court
found in favor of Pipeline Company, finding that it could condemn
easements across the land so long as it made appropriate payments to
Property Owner for market value of the land. Property Owner appealed,
alleging the trial court erred in finding for Pipeline Company after it failed
to show a necessity for the taking and that he had presented sufficient
evidence to survive the summary judgment stage. The Court of Appeals of
Texas held that: (1) no evidence was provided to support Property Owner’s
affirmative defenses; (2) Pipeline Company had expressed a sufficient
necessity for the takings, espousing on multiple occasions that the
purported path was necessary for efficiency and public convenience; and
(3) no evidence existed that Pipeline Company acted arbitrarily or abused
its discretion in plotting its pipeline’s path—neither in violation of existing
case law, nor via its failure to supervise its agents’ decisions, nor via its
refusal to consider Property Owner’s requests to alter the path. The court
also held that Pipeline Company’s amendment to its petition, agreeing to
pay a portion of the costs which Property Owner sought to recover, did not
act as an abandonment equivalent to dismissal of its condemnation claim.
Finally, the court held that the trial court did not err in excluding Property
Owner’s expert witnesses because their testimony would not have mended
the issues with Property Owner’s positions that eventually led to the
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summary judgment against him. For those reasons, the court affirmed the
trial court’s judgment.
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SELECTED WATER DECISIONS
Federal
9th Cir.
United States v. U.S. Bd. of Water Comm’rs, 893 F.3d 578 (9th Cir. 2018).
Farmers brought suit claiming injury to their water rights as a result of a
voluntary water rights leasing program managed by National Fish and
Wildlife Foundation (“NFWF”), which was created to convey water from a
river downstream to a lake. NFWF applied with Nevada State Engineer
(“Engineer”) for two change applications to its program: (1) a request
changing the place of use to a broader area; and (2) changing the purpose of
use from irrigation to wildlife purposes. The farmers objected to these
change applications claiming that they violated their “New Land Stored
Water Rights” because the changes would decrease the amount of reservoir
water available for irrigation. Engineer rejected Farmers’ arguments and
granted NFWF’s application, finding that Farmers would not suffer any
injury. Farmers appealed this finding to a Decree court, which rejected the
findings of Engineer and found that the program would in fact injure the
Farmers’ water rights. NFWF and Engineer appealed this finding. On
appeal the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Decree court failed
to give dereference to the findings and conclusions of Engineer. Upon
review of the case, the appellate court found that Engineer properly found
that: (1) a transfer to the Foundation limited to the consumption portion
would avoid conflict and injury to other existing water rights; (2) the
findings were supported by substantial evidence; and (3) Engineer applied
the correct legal rule. Thus, the court held that there would be no injury to
the Farmers’ rights.
Mono Cty. v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 890 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2018).
County appealed the decision of the district court finding that a previously
agreed to decree regulating a water basin did not allow for allocation of
water from the basin to an area lake. On appeal the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that the district court erred in dismissing County’s
complaint. Therefore, the court set out to determine whether the decree
could be amended to allow for allocation of water flow to the lake. The
court felt that this would be determined based upon whether the public trust
doctrine was applicable to previously set rights under the doctrine of prior
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appropriation and permitted alteration of prior allocations. After review, the
court determined that any decision they made would have a significant
impact on Nevada water law, but based upon existing Nevada law, the court
was unsure how the Nevada Supreme Court would itself resolve the matter.
Therefore, the court held that it would need certification of the issue to the
Nevada Supreme Court.
D. New Mexico
San Juan Citizens All. v.U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 16-cv-376-MCAJHR, 2018 WL 2994406 (D.N.M. June 14, 2018).
Environmental Organization filed suit against Government Agencies over
Government Agencies’ decision to lease several parcels of federal mineral
estate on federal land, alleging violation of the National Environmental
Policy Act (“NEPA”). The district court found that: (1) Government
Agencies failed to adequately consider—via a “hard look”—downstream
greenhouse gas emissions from the leases, thus requiring remand of the case
for a new cumulative impact analysis, and such analysis must be done with
up-to-date scientific tools and analyses; (2) because such analyses must be
revised, the court declined to examine them specifically; (3) because the
evidence upon which Environmental Organization’s claim about air quality
was based was incomplete, it could not be concluded that Government
Agencies failed to take a “hard look” at the cumulative impacts to air
quality from the leases; (4) Government Agencies failed to utilize the
information in its possession regarding the impacts of the leases on water
quantity, and thus, failed its duty to take a “hard look” at that environmental
impact; (5) Government Agencies met their “hard look” duty regarding
water quality; and (6) the requirement of revised impact analyses prevented
the court from addressing the other issues raised by Environmental
Organization. For those reasons, the court set aside both the leases and the
finding of no significant impact and remanded the matter to Government
Agencies for further analysis consistent with the court’s findings.
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State
Colorado
Jim Hutton Educ. Found. v. Rein, 2018 CO 38M.
Surface Water Owners (“Owners”) filed suit against State Engineer over
concerns that permitted groundwater wells, which other individuals had
begun installing in the groundwater basin under their surface water, had not
been pumping designated groundwater, and thus, had been negatively
affecting their senior surface water rights. A recent legislative amendment
created a rule precluding any redrawn water basin boundaries from
excluding any already existing wells, effectively precluding the redress
sought by Owners, so Owners’ main argument was that the legislative
amendment was unconstitutional. The case was filed in Water Court, which
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because State Commission
had not yet determined whether the water in question was designated
groundwater. Owners appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court, which held
as follows: (1) because the issue did not involve any disputed facts, it would
review the question of subject matter jurisdiction de novo; (2) because state
statutory framework dictates that State Commission has jurisdiction over
claims involving designated groundwater, and Water Court has those
involving non-designated ground water, Water Court’s decision was legally
sound; and (3) the unique constitutional nature of Owners’ claims did not
do enough to overcome their burden of proving that the Water Court should
have jurisdiction. For those reasons, the Court affirmed the Water Court’s
dismissal of the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Michigan
Gottleber v. Cty. of Saginaw, No. 336011, 2018 WL 2944211 (Mich. Ct.
App. June 12, 2018).
Property Owners filed suit against County after County ceased pumping
water from the property due to its decision to use abutting property for a
Dredged Material Disposal Facility (“DMDF”) and Wetland Mitigation
Area (“WMA”), and Property Owners’ property subsequently flooded. The
trial court found that the DMDF was a federal project, and thus, County had
no liability at all for the flooding caused by that project. The trial court also
found that the cessation of pumping from the WMA did not constitute an
affirmative act necessary to make County liable. Property Owners appealed,
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and the Court of Appeals of Michigan held that: (1) the record showed that
County was involved with the DMDF from the beginning and still owned
the property on which it was housed, thus making it a proper party to
Property Owners’ claims regarding it; (2) County’s removal of pumps from
the WMA site constituted an affirmative action, which was enough to
constitute liability; (3) Property Owners offered sufficient evidence to clear
the summary dismissal threshold regarding why they believed County’s
actions caused the flooding of the property; and (4) County’s argument that
it was immune from liability because it was acting in accordance with the
United States Army Corps of Engineers was inconsistent with existing
authority. For those reasons, the court reversed the trial court’s order for
summary disposition in favor of County and remanded the issue for further
proceedings consistent with its holdings.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
New Hampshire
In re Cook, No. 2017–0142, 2018 WL 2074773 (N.H. May 4, 2018).
Property Owner filed an appeal seeking review of Wetlands Council’s
decision to uphold Government Agency’s denial of Property Owner’s
permit request to extend his dock onto a local river. The Supreme Court of
New Hampshire held that because the key question in this case was whether
Property Owner could adequately establish a justification for his dock
extension based on a “need,” and the term “need” was undefined by the
state legislature, the term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
Because Government Agency did not have the court’s guidance in making
its initial interpretation of the statute and ruling on Property Owner’s permit
application, the Court vacated the decision and remanded it to Government
Agency for further review consistent with those findings. The Court further
held that Property Owner’s ability to use an existing dock with “all-tide
access” located on an abutting property was irrelevant to the question of
whether Property Owner had shown “need” in this particular instance. For
those reasons, the question was reversed and remanded for further
consideration.
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New Jersey
Oaks Dev. Corp. v. Planning Bd. Of Twp. of Old Bridge, No. A-2666-16T2,
2018 WL 1996966 (N.J. Apr. 30, 2018).
Development Company appealed a decision affirming City Government’s
determination to deny Development Company’s application to connect its
project with City Government’s system without a one-million-gallon water
storage tank. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that City
Government’s decision was entitled to a presumption of validity, and that
presumption, combined with the evidence in the record supporting
Government Agency’s determination that the development would require
additional water storage capacity, was sufficient to justify the affirmation of
City Government’s decision. Because Development Company failed to
introduce evidence that would overcome its significant burden to rebut
Government Agency’s presumption of validity, the Court affirmed City
Government’s decision to deny Development Company’s application.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
South Carolina
Jowers v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, No. 2016-000428, 2018
WL 2449220 (S.C. May 30, 2018).
Landowners of property along rivers and streams in South Carolina
(“Landowners”) brought suit against South Carolina Department of Health
and Environmental Control (“DHEC”) challenging the registration
provisions in the Surface Water Withdrawal Act (“Act”). This provision of
the Act allows persons to make surface water withdrawals without a permit
if done for agricultural purposes. Landowners challenged this provision
claiming that the provision constituted (1) an unconstitutional taking of
private property for private use and was a violation of their due process
rights by depriving them of their property without notice or an opportunity
to be heard; and (2) a violation of the public trust doctrine that forbids the
disposal of assets held by the State in trust. The district court granted
DHEC’s motion for summary judgment after finding that Landowners did
not have standing. The court also found that there was no unconstitutional
taking of private property because landowners were not deprived of any
rights, and subsequently, there was also no violation of due process.
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Additionally, the court found that the public trust doctrine was not violated
because Landowners never lost their right to use the surface water, and
there were no injuries as a result of the withdrawals. Landowners appealed.
On appeal the Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld the lower court
finding that there was no unconstitutional taking of private party because
Landowners failed to show the taking of the property was unreasonable,
and regarding the public trust claims, the court found Landowners failed to
show that any public trust asset had been lost as a result of agricultural
users withdrawing surface water, and any claims of future harms were not
justiciable.
Duncan v. Drasites, No. 2016–000046, 2018 WL 2230560 (S.C. Ct. App.
May 16, 2018).
Property Owner appealed the ruling of Master-in-Equity that Easement
Holder had an easement on Property Owner’s property. Master-in-Equity
found that: (1) the easement was created to allow the dominant estate access
to the lake, therefore burdening the entire property line; and (2) that
Easement Holder had the right to launch small watercraft into the lake from
the easement. The Court of Appeals of South Carolina held that Master-inEquity did not err in either determination because: (1) the intent of the
grantor could not have been to give Easement Holder an easement that
ended just short of the lake (or just at the lake if the water was high); (2) all
plats in both parties’ chains of title evidenced an easement ending at the
water’s edge; and (3) the ability to launch small watercraft from the
easement was “incident to the enjoyment” of said easement, and therefore
was not a burden on the property. For those reasons, the court affirmed
Master-in-Equity’s decision.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
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SELECTED LAND DECISIONS
Federal
8th Cir.
Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate of Lake Traverse Reservation v. U.S. Corps of
Eng’rs, 888 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. Apr. 25, 2018).
Tribe claimed that U.S. Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) was not adhering to
proper administrative procedure and had erroneously allowed Landowner to
construct a road under the pretext of agricultural use when, rather, it was for
Landowner’s own private development. Tribe alleged violations of federal
laws by Corps for its failure to preserve the lake. Tribe appealed the lower
court’s decision to dismiss the majority of its claims. On appeal, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that Tribe’s prior notice to Landowner,
that the authorization was subject to recapture, and any subsequent efforts
to enforce were subject to Corps’ discretion and, thus, were essentially
nonjusticiable. The court also affirmed the lower court’s determination that
Corps’ communications regarding the exemption determinations and permit
issuance were not final agency action, even though this did little to assist
the Tribe with its statute of limitations defense. The court also held that the
permits issued to Landowner were not “inappropriately stacked” or
interrelated as Tribe claimed but were instead separate and independent
projects.
M.D. Louisiana
United States v. 9.345 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in Iberville
Parish, State of Louisiana, No. 11-00803-JWD-EWD, 2018 WL 1920169
(M.D. La. Apr. 24, 2018).
This case involved a federal eminent domain action to acquire and protect a
cavernous natural resource reserve from Company. The court reviewed
opposing motions in limine to exclude evidence and affirmed the
Government’s motion to exclude “scope of the project” evidence because
no change in market value was actually shown due to the condemnation. In
their separate motions, Government requested to exclude Company’s
“condemnation blight” evidence, or evidence showing adverse impacts of
the condemnation, while Company requested to exclude Government’s
evidence of Company’s lack of action in marketing the property and the
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efficiency of conversion of the cavern’s use for the Government’s intended
purpose. The district court held that since this taking was a federal eminent
domain proceeding and was de jure, a taking for public interest based in
law rather than on fact, evaluating the “condemnation blight” evidence was
not appropriate. Likewise, the “scope of the project” evidence to show
negative impact on market value was found to be inappropriate in this case,
because there was no dispute or evidence showing that the market value of
the property was negatively impacted. Although Government’s motion was
partially denied, the court provided an allowance for Company to present
additional evidence in the future that the eminent domain status, and
advertisement of this status, prevented them from further developing and
capitalizing on the maximum market value of the property prior to the
actual taking.
D. Maine
Coastal Me. Botanical Gardens v. Town of Boothbay, Maine, No. 2:17-cv00493-JDL, 2018 WL 1915923 (D. Me. Apr. 23, 2018).
This case involved Developer’s claims alleging violation of procedural due
process. Developer had a development permit in place, but the permit was
rescinded after objections from other residents. Intervenors, who owned
neighboring property, appealed the grant of the development permit. The
town’s Board of Appeals (“Board”) reviewed, conducted an investigation,
and visited the property and development site. However, Developer alleged
this to be improper ex parte communication. Developer requested that the
Board members who visited the property independently recuse themselves
from the subsequent review and determination process. The decision
ultimately came down to those votes, and Developer’s permit was rescinded
because Developer’s proposed plans were not found to be appropriate for
the proposed site of the development, which is in a watershed overlay. An
agreement and settlement for a consent decree was reached, but Intervenors
objected to the decree, claiming that the decree would prevent them from
continuing to fight Developer’s proposed plans. After judicial review, the
court granted the motion for entry of the consent decree. The court found
that the consent decree was valid for various reasons, most notably the
efficiency for facilitating an agreement between the parties, and noted that
Intervenors were not barred by the consent decree to further pursue their
objections through judicial review.
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E.D. Washington
Little Butte Prop. Owners Water Ass’n v. Bradley, No. 2:17-CV-162-RMP,
2018 WL 1975682 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 26, 2018).
Landowner had grandfathered water rights but objected and restricted
Association from accessing his property to facilitate access to water, despite
an existing easement for that purpose. The district court granted County’s
motion to dismiss constitutional claims, granted Association’s motion to
dismiss Landowner’s counterclaims, and granted Association’s motion to
exclude Landowner’s witness testimony, but denied Landowner’s motion
for a preliminary injunction. The court determined that additional
constitutional violation claims, civil rights claims against County and
Association stemming from the other claims, were dismissed along with the
court’s grant of County’s motion to dismiss. The court granted the motion
to dismiss the injunctive relief claim because no urgency or requested relief
was reflected in the pleadings. Landowner was not ultimately asking for the
type of injunctive relief he requested initially. The court sanctioned
Landowner by not allowing Landowner’s witnesses, and the court
determined that the witnesses were not reliable, since Landowner did not
provide enough evidence to deem them reliable and failed to provide timely
notice of their intent to provide information and their qualifications.
State
Florida
Blok Builders, LLC v. Katryniok, No. 4D16-1811, 2018 WL 1940951 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2018).
Landowner sued Company and Contractors for negligence that resulted in
damages and injury caused to Landowner’s property, specifically the
collapse of Landowner’s driveway, due to Company and Contractor’s
manipulation of the subsurface utility lines. Subcontractors appealed the
lower court’s decision to grant summary judgment motions brought
regarding crossclaims. The lower court held that even though there was an
indemnification provision within the agreement itself, the subcontract was
not subject to the indemnification statute relied upon for the claim. Since it
was excavation of subsurface utilities, rather than construction of an actual
structure, the court held that Subcontractor’s work did not constitute the
type of construction covered by the statute. The court relied on the statute’s
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plain language to find that the contract was not covered by the
indemnification statutes. Accordingly, the District Court of Appeal of
Florida reversed the lower court’s finding, holding instead that
Subcontractor was not legally obligated to indemnify the initial contracting
party, but affirmed the lower court’s finding that Subcontractor was
obligated to indemnify the direct Contractor, with whom it had a
contractual relationship.
Kansas
NPIF2 Kan. Ave., LLC v. BH Invs., LLC, 416 P.3d 1044 (Kan. Ct. App.
Apr. 27, 2018).
Landowner I appealed the lower court’s decision granting Landowner II an
irrevocable license to be established between the two landowners of
adjacent and abutting property. Because the two parties could not establish
an independent and voluntary agreement that would facilitate a mutual use,
the court enforced a license allowing such use for both parties. The granting
of the license was based essentially on “equitable relief” because the license
was mutually beneficial to both parties to the extent that it was necessary
for each “to achieve the best use of their respective property.” Although the
Court of Appeals of Kansas here affirmed the lower court’s establishment
of the license between the two properties, the court also held that no notice
was provided for the imposition of an injunction that would prevent the
license’s revocation without the sale of one of the properties. Therefore,
because such notice to the parties is required, the court reversed the lower
court’s granting of the injunction.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Kentucky
Big Sandy Co., L.P. v. EQT Gathering, LLC, 545 S.W.3d 842 (Ky. Apr. 26,
2018).
A pipeline easement agreement between Pipeline Owner and Estate Owner
required that if Estate Owner planned to mine in the easement area stated in
the agreement, Pipeline Owner would be required to move the pipeline,
paying all costs to do so, or purchase the mineral rights at depths below the
pipeline from Estate Owner. This situation occurred, but because the
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specific tracts that Estate Owner planned to mine housed pipeline
infrastructure that was already existing in those locations prior to the
development of the pipeline easement agreement, Pipeline Owner disputed
that the easement agreement applied to those specific tracts. Estate Owner
requested review of appellate court’s reversal of circuit court’s finding that
the easement agreement in place between Estate Owner and Pipeline Owner
applied to the specific tracts under dispute. The Supreme Court of Kentucky
essentially reversed the reversal, siding with Estate Owner due to the
unambiguous nature of the contract and its lack of differentiation between
existing and future pipeline installations and its clear reference to the
authority held by Estate Owner to use the surface to develop minerals, even
though Estate Owner only held mineral rights on the specific tracts. The
Court further held that the agreement did ultimately apply to those tracts
and Pipeline Owner was bound to the pipeline relocation or mineral
purchase requirements of the agreement regarding those specific tracts.
Michigan
Savoy Energy LP v. Beasinger, No. 336392, 2018 WL 2166044 (Mich. Ct.
App. May 10, 2018).
Servient Estate Owner (“Servient”) brought this action against Dominant
Estate Owner (Dominant”), alleging Dominant was overburdening the
easement. Dominant owned a piece of land that was landlocked. Dominant
obtained an easement against Servient from the previous landowner. The
easement was for the ingress and egress from the property as well as public
utilities. However, at the end of the conveyance of the land, it also made
reference to oil and gas interests. Dominant decided to drill for oil and used
heavy machinery that was transported on the easement. Servient claimed
that Dominant unduly burdened the easement tract of land and damaged the
land itself. The lower court determined that Dominant could use the
easement going forward but only for emergency purposes because
Dominant unduly burdened and damaged the easement tract of land. The
Court of Appeals of Michigan determined that Dominant could use the
easement with heavy machinery because previous owners used heavy
machinery on the easement land. Additionally, the appellate court
determined that Dominant did overburden and damage the easement but
concluded that the lower court’s determination was too extreme. The
appellate court remanded the case in order for the lower court to determine
a remedy that was more equitable to both parties.
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This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
New Jersey
Larue v. Monmouth Cty. Agric. Dev. Bd., No. A–2608–16T1, 2018 WL
1790073 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 16, 2018).
Farm Owners appealed Development Board’s decision that farm was not
entitled to protection under the Right to Farm Act (“RTFA”). State
Agricultural Development Committee (“Committee”) overturned
Development Board’s decision, and the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Appellate Division, affirmed. The court held that the original deciding body
applied a stricter test than is required by New Jersey authority, which
simply calls for “’a legitimate, agriculturally-based reason’ for the
agricultural management practice at issue.” The court held that
Committee’s decision to overturn that finding based on the application of
the correct standard was proper, and accordingly affirmed the reversal in
favor of Farm Owners.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Pennsylvania
Condemnation of Permanent & Temp. Rights of Way for Transp. of Nat.
Gas in Buffalo v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Supply Corp., No. 1093 C.D. 2017, 2018
WL 2945112 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 13, 2018).
Pipeline Operator requested an easement from Landowner for the
construction of a natural gas pipeline across its land. Landowner refused,
and an eminent domain case was filed. Landowner challenged the amount
of compensation that was awarded for the easement by the jury.
Landowner’s expert testimony from land appraisers was excluded, and
some of Pipeline Operator’s expert testimony was allowed by the lower
court. Landowners challenged the exclusion of their expert’s testimony as
to the value of the land and the subsequent compensation awarded by the
jury. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania found that the
trial court did not err by allowing the introduction of Pipeline Operator’s
expert testimony. In addition, the court found that the trial court
appropriately excluded Landowner’s expert testimony because the Pipeline
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Operator’s testimony took into account the land value before and after the
pipeline easement.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Texas
Tabrizi v. City of Austin, No. 08-16-00209-CV, 2018 WL 1940556 (Tex.
App. Apr. 25, 2018).
Landowners appealed lower court’s decision to dismiss their claims against
City and Employees. City denied Landowners from developing their
property because of environmental issues with the development site,
preventing both issuance of building permits and approval of an application
for subdivision platting. Landowners’ request for an exemption from
relevant requirements was denied. Landowners then brought a lawsuit
claiming ultra vires, that City and Employees inappropriately and
erroneously applied City’s land use regulations to their property and
exceeded the scope of their duty. The lower court found that it lacked
jurisdiction to evaluate City’s application of its ordinances. Landowners
objected to this and requested additional review. Upon this review, the
Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the district court’s decision, evaluating
the statutory authority vested in the municipal officials and holding that
neither City nor Employees exceeded their authority in imposing
restrictions and regulations on land use. City and Employees sought
immunity due to their activities, the application and enforcement of land
use ordinances, their governmental functions, and their actions being within
their official authority as municipal representatives. The court maintained
that there was no jurisdiction to construe municipal ordinances, even
though Landowners claimed there was because they were seeking no
monetary relief.
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SELECTED ELECTRICITY DECISIONS

Traditional Generation
Maryland
Montgomery Cty. v. GenOn Mid-Atlantic, LLC, No. 2626, Sept. Term,
2016, 2018 WL 1920116 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 24, 2018).
Power Plant filed suit to prevent County from issuing back-taxes based on
its new interpretation of a state statute authorizing a tax on “station power,”
or such power generated by Power Plant specifically used to power its
operations. A Tax Court found in favor of Power Plant, and County filed
for judicial review. The lower court upheld the ruling of the Tax Court, and
County appealed. Because the statute requires that taxes be levied upon
“delivery for final consumption in the County,” and Power Plant could not
deliver generated power to itself, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
declined to hold that the lower court’s finding was erroneous. For that
reason, the court affirmed the lower court’s finding in favor of Power Plant.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
New Hampshire
In re Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC, No. 2017–0007, 2018 WL
2307061 (N.H. May 22, 2018).
Electric Company and Owner/Operator filed for review of an opinion
issued by Public Utilities Commission (“PUC”), dismissing Electric
Company’s petition to have a proposed contract for natural gas
transportation and storage in order to be used by electric generation
facilities approved and for associated details surrounding that approval. The
Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed PUC’s decision. To make its
determination, the Court looked to the intent of the state’s legislature in its
recent restructuring of state law. The lower court found that allowing an
Electric Company to purchase long-term gas capacity was contrary to the
new statutes’ requirement that generation activities should be functionally
separate from transmission and distribution activities. The Supreme Court
of New Hampshire disagreed, holding that the “functional separation”
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requirement was more permissive than PUC had read it and that it was to be
read with the understanding that the primary goal of the restructured statute
was “to reduce electricity costs to consumers.” For that reason, the Court
reversed and remanded the issue to PUC for proceedings consistent with its
opinion.
Oklahoma
In re Application of Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 2018 OK 31, 417 P.3d 1186.
In 2014, Electricity Company sought approval from Corporation
Commission on Electricity Company’s application for capital expenditure
to install pollution-control devices at one of its power plants. When the
application was denied by Corporation Commission, Electricity Company
applied again in 2016 and was approved. Citizen Advocates sought review
of Corporation Commission’s pre-approval of the installation of the
scrubbers and the Oklahoma Supreme Court retained jurisdiction. Citizen
Advocates claimed that res judicata precluded the second application and
should accordingly should be invalidated. The Court disagreed, stating that
Corporation Commission was exercising its legislative power, as opposed
to its judicial power because it was considering the application based on
future implications and making a new rule to be applied thereafter, not
ruling on the legal propriety of the application, since it had already ruled
against it in the first application. However, the Court did find that
Corporation Commission lacked the authority to approve the application
outside of the proper statute. Thus, the Court vacated the order of
Corporation Commission, recommending that Electricity Company reapply under the correct statute.
Wisconsin
Town of Holland v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n. of Wis., 2018 WI App 38, No.
2017AP1129, 2018 WL 2448579.
Town sued Public Service Commission (“Commission”), arguing against
Commission’s approval of the construction and operation of high voltage
transmission line for electrical utilities. In its argument for judicial review,
Town alleged that the Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) conducted
by Commission was insufficient. Commission argued that the construction
and operation of the high voltage transmission line was necessary to allow
for an adequate supply of electricity to an area near Town. Citing
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Wisconsin state law, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin ruled against
Town, finding that the transmission line construction could be construed by
Commission as being for the “reasonable needs of the public.” Because the
appellate court grants deference to Commission’s prior decisions under
review, the court’s review of the EIS was based on the adequacy of rational
basis, as the court affords weight deference to the reasonableness of
Commission’s adequacy determination. Ultimately, the appellate court held
that Commission had conformed to the standard set out by state law in
providing a rational basis for the approval order in controversy.
Renewable Generation
N.D. California
Tech. Credit Corp. v. N.J. Christian Acad., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d 993 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 18, 2018).
Company filed suit against Church and School for breach of contract after
Company provided funding for a failed solar energy project. Church and
School filed a Motion to Dismiss and, alternatively, Motions for Improper
Venue due to a forum selection clause in the contract, and a Motion to
Transfer. The breach of contract claim stemmed from a series of events
leading to the failed solar energy project between Church and School and a
third-party Energy Company. Company initiated this action to collect its
alleged damages as a result of Church and School’s failures to pay back the
cost of the failed project. The district court found that: (1) although much of
the process surrounding the creation of the contract in question took place
in New Jersey, enough significant conduct related to the suit at hand took
place in the Northern District of California to qualify it as a proper venue
for the action; (2) the forum selection clause in the contract requiring
disputes to be handled in California was valid, and thus, there was no
reason to transfer the suit out of California; and (3) no other factor,
including the court’s familiarity with governing law, local interest in the
suit, burden on the local judicial system, court congestion, parties’ choice of
forum, or costs of resolving a dispute which is unrelated to the particular
forum outweighed the validity of the forum selection clause and provided a
reason to transfer the action out of California. For those reasons, the court
denied Church and School’s motions to dismiss and to transfer the action to
New Jersey.
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SELECTED TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS DECISIONS
Bankruptcy
5th Cir.
In re ATP Oil & Gas Corp. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 888 F.3d 122 (5th
Cir. 2018).
Service Providers appealed grant of Investor’s motion to dismiss Service
Providers’ claims. After Corporation filed for bankruptcy, Service
Providers, who had fostered Corporation’s operations, brought claims to
enforce their existing liens and retain them as part of the bankruptcy estate,
rather than allow them to be excluded as separate royalty interests conveyed
to Investor, in response to Investor’s attempt to exclude the royalty
interests. Conveyance of these royalty interests occurred after Service
Providers’ liens were filed. Liens were attached to operating interest, and
overriding royalty interests were conveyed to Investor. However, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that liens cannot attach to the royalty interest,
since that interest was previously conveyed, even if the minerals had not yet
been extracted. The court evaluated the statutory “safe-harbor provision,”
specifically addressing whether that provision applied to the overriding
royalty interests conveyed. By evaluating the statutory language, the court
determined that the safe harbor provision applied because Service Providers
did not give “actual notice,” or provide any evidence that they did so, of
their outstanding liens at the time of purchase of the overriding royalty
interests. Therefore, the liens cannot attach to the royalty interests and the
lower court’s decision to grant Investor’s Motion to Dismiss was affirmed.
Mergers & Acquisition
D. Colorado
United States v. Pioneer Nat. Res. Co., No. 17–cv–0168–WJM–NYW,
2018 WL 1858549 (D. Colo. Apr. 18, 2018).
Agency claimed that Company failed to take proper action to remediate
problems with their mining operations, resulting in the release of
contaminates into nearby water bodies. This action was brought to
determine whether Company is liable for such illegal activity as successor
of their predecessor company. CERCLA allows claims to be made against
the entity that “at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
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operated any facility.” Even though in an asset sale, also included in
Company’s history, such liabilities are not transferred to the buying party,
such liability can be conveyed (1) if such liability is taken on “expressly or
impliedly,” (2) if the buying party is essentially a successor or a
“continuation” of the selling party, (3) if the companies are merged, or (4)
if the sale is an attempt to relieve seller from liabilities. The district court
disagreed with Company’s claims that it was not the owner or operator of
the mining operation at the time of discharge. The court granted Agency’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that the history of corporate
mergers shows Company to be the successor and thus the liable party
through indirect or successor liability, despite the lack of documentation
showing that acceptance of liability was taken voluntarily or knowingly.
Intellectual Property – Federal
Supreme Court
Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S.Ct.
1365 (2018).
Patent Owner filed suit against Energy Company for infringement of a
patent pertaining to technology used for protecting wellhead equipment
utilized during hydraulic fracturing, petitioning both the Patent and
Trademark Office (“PTO”) for inter partes review, and filing suit in district
court. The district court ruled in favor of Energy Company, while PTO
found in favor of Patent Owner. Patent Owner appealed, challenging the
constitutionality of inter partes review for violating its right to a jury trial.
The Federal Circuit summarily affirmed the ruling of the district court. On
appeal, the Supreme Court, addressing only the constitutionality of inter
partes review, held that because inter partes review fell within the “publicrights doctrine,” PTO has authorization to conduct such review without
violating Article III of the constitution.
E.D. Virginia
Cooper v. Greenly Grp. for Solar Techs., Ltd., No. 1:17–cv–1313–LMB–
MSN, 2018 WL 1875291 (E.D. Va. Apr. 18, 2018).
Individual alleged that Third Party fraudulently transferred the patent rights
in question to Energy Company after Individual filed an arbitration demand
in order to resolve a dispute with Third Party. The arbitrator found against
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Third Party for a large monetary amount, and Third Party fled the country
to avoid collection efforts by Individual. The district court adopted the
findings of a Magistrate Judge and entered a default judgment against
Energy Company.
Intellectual Property – State
Pennsylvania
Weiss v. Fritch, Inc., No. 2332 EDA 2017. 2018 WL 1940109 (Pa. Super.
Ct. Apr. 25, 2018).
Landowner sued Oil Provider and Environmental Service for negligence
because of damage done to Landowner’s oil tank and home. Landowner
entered into a contract with Oil Provider to receive oil in his 275-gallon
aboveground oil storage tank in the basement of his home. When the tank
was installed, Oil Provider gave Landowner a pamphlet promoting
Environmental Service’s “TankSure Program,” which would provide
corrosion protection and annual tests for tank corrosion as well as warranty
for a replacement tank. Landowner opted to enroll in the program, and oil
deliveries and program activities began. However, in December 2014, Oil
Provider refilled Landowner’s tank, causing it to rupture and spill
approximately 100 gallons of oil in the basement. Oil Provider cleaned up
the spill, removed the tank, and installed a new tank but did not use proper
procedures and caused further damage to Landowner’s house. The trial
court dismissed the negligence claims on the grounds that Landowner had
not proven that the TankSure Program falsely advertised any benefits or
qualities it did not possess. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
found that Landowner failed on a claim of breach of contract, which it then
attempted to rebrand as a claim of false advertising, which, likewise, failed.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
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Other Issues – Federal
5th Cir.
Entergy Texas, Inc. v. Nelson, 889 F.3d 205 (5th Cir. 2018).
Plaintiff Operating Company filed suit against Public Utility Commission
of Texas (“Utility Commission”) on the grounds that Utility Commission’s
previous order concerning the allocation of bandwidth payments conflicted
with a prior Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) order.
FERC regulates energy production and sale that takes place across state
lines, and Operating Company performs as a public utility in multiple
states. Thus, Operating Company falls under FERC’s jurisdiction. To
ensure that Operating Company’s different state-based subsidiaries
maintained approximately equal costs of production, FERC maintained a
system of bandwidth payments that ensured that, on a yearly basis, “...if
necessary, ‘payments [are] made by the low cost Operating Company(ies)
to the high cost Operating Company(ies) such that, after reflecting the
payments and receipts, no Operating Company [has] production costs more
than 11 percent above the Entergy System average or more than 11 percent
below the Entergy System average.’” However, the issue presents itself at
state borders because state regulators determine what effect bandwidth
payments have on retail rates for customers. In 2007, this became an issue
for Texas and Louisiana regulators as they had, in 2006, a shared subsidiary
under Operating Company. The respective regulators of the two states had
differing opinions concerning the proper split of their $120.1 million
bandwidth payment, resulting in Operating Company owing more to the
two state legislatures than it had received the previous year. Naturally,
Operating Company argued this to be unfair and took its complaint to
FERC which dismissed the matter multiple times until Operating Company
filed suit in district court where the court found in Operating Company’s
favor, enjoining enforcement of Utility Commission’s order for payment.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that FERC was correct in
dismissing the matter and that Utility Commission’s order was not
preempted by FERC’s order.
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9th Cir.
Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Westside Delivery, LLC, 888
F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2018).
After conveyance of property through a tax sale, the court considered
whether Purchaser was responsible for CERCLA-imposed penalties for
activity that occurred during Previous Owner’s operation. A site
remediation plan was developed but was not carried out prior to Previous
Owner’s failure to pay taxes and the subsequent tax foreclosure sale. After
the tax sale, Department implemented the plan and took action to clean up
the site, but sought reimbursement of the associated costs from Purchaser,
who then claimed that its interest was as a third-party to the contamination,
without a “contractual relationship” with the party initially responsible for
the contamination and thus was not obligated to take on the costs of
remediation. Generally, this was a defense offered by CERCLA that allows
a party to avoid liability as an uninterested third party to a violation. The
lower court agreed with Purchaser, and Department appealed. On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision,
holding that Purchaser was responsible and still liable for the costs, and the
relationship between the parties could not fall under the “third party
defense.” This was because the tax sale transaction did constitute a
contractual relationship between the parties, and Purchaser was not an
“innocent” party or purchaser with no knowledge of the property’s history
of contamination, and all acts causing the contamination occurred on the
property itself and were caused by the Previous Owner. Therefore, the court
reversed and remanded the lower court’s decision.
N.D. West Virginia
Corder v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 1:18CV30, 2018 WL 2925128 (N.D.W.
Va. June 11, 2018).
Oil and gas royalty owners (“Royalty Owners”) brought suit against
Producer for breach of contract and improper reduction of their payments.
Royalty Owners alleged that Producer had made improper reductions of
their royalty payments, overcharged them for deductions, and failed to pay
them for the volume of natural gas they had extracted and sold. Producer
filed a motion to dismiss, claiming the royalty agreements between the
parties allowed them to make necessary deductions of payments. The
district court dismissed these claims on the grounds that clauses in contract
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allow for it. However, the court dismissed all claims but one for breach of
contract. The court found that in the case of a single breach of contract
claim, there was an express prohibition of reduction of costs in order to
market the oil. The court denied the motion to dismiss the claim that
Producer improperly reduced the cost it at which it was selling oil in order
to market it. Royalty Owners’ suit was kept alive by this claim and the
court allowed it to proceed.
Other Issues – State
Texas
Bosque Disposal Sys., LLC v. Parker Cty. Appraisal Dist., No. 17–0146,
2018 WL 2372810 (Tex. May 25, 2018).
Taxpayers alleged that they were subject to illegal double taxation by
County after the land they owned was taxed as well as the saltwater
disposal wells that laid beneath the land. The trial court found that this did
amount to illegal taxation. However, upon appeal, the appellate court found
for County. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Texas held that under the
Texas Tax Code, the separate taxation by County of the property’s surface
and the property’s subsurface saltwater disposal wells was completely
proper. The court noted that although the land and improvements are
typically taxed as one, per the Tax Code, County is permitted to separate
them and tax individually. Additionally, the court rejected Taxpayer’s claim
that the saltwater disposal wells were not taxable because they were
intangible personal property in addition to a claim that County was taxing
Taxpayers business interest in the disposal wells.
Eagle Oil & Gas Co. v. Shale Expl., LLC, No. 01–15–00888–CV, 2018 WL
1870081 (Tex. App. Apr. 19, 2018).
Oil and Gas Company (“O&G Company”) appealed a jury award to
Exploration Company regarding “misappropriation of trade secrets.” O&G
Company claimed that Exploration Company’s claim was subject to claim
preclusion, and thus barred, and lacked sufficient evidence to show O&G
Company’s liability regarding the alleged misappropriation. The Court of
Appeals of Texas affirmed the lower court’s finding that Exploration
Company’s claim was not barred by claim preclusion because no privity
existed between Exploration Company and other related companies that
were involved in earlier, similar actions. The court also found that the
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“economic loss rule” did not bar the claim because the claim is not required
to be a contract claim but could be a separate misappropriation claim.
Additionally, the court held that adequate evidence was presented to show
that the subject of the dispute was in fact a trade secret and that O&G
Company did actually misuse such information, due in part to the presence
of confidentiality requirements and the history of communication provided
by O&G Company. The court did, however, reverse the lower court’s
support of the jury’s finding that such misappropriation was shown to be a
result of malice, supported by adequate evidence. Therefore, the court also
held that Exploration Company could not receive exemplary damages, due
to the lack of malice.
Lona Hills Ranch, LLC v. Creative Oil & Gas Operating, LLC, No. 03-1700743-CV, 2018 WL 1868054 (Tex. App. Apr. 19, 2018).
Lessee and Operator sued Lessor for a breach of contract claim as counter
to Lessor’s trespass claim regarding an oil and gas lease. Lessor appealed
the lower court’s interlocutory decision to deny Lessor’s motion to dismiss
Operator’s and Lessee’s counterclaims after Lessor’s initial trespass claims.
The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed in part the lower court’s denial of
Operator’s motion to dismiss and denied in part, dismissing all of
Operator’s breach of contract counterclaims and a counterclaim for breach
of contract brought by Lessee pertaining to the lease’s validity. The court
held that the breach of contract counterclaim was not supported by adequate
evidence “regarding Lessor’s alleged communications with third parties,”
but also that Lessor successfully showed that the elements of the
counterclaims were “predicated factually on lessor's exercise of right of free
speech” and on “lessor’s right to petition.” This was based on Operator’s
and Lessee’s reference to multiple statements and filing of a court action by
Lessor. Further, no evidence was provided that such statements were
restricted by the lease contract.
Ramsland v. WFW Family, LP, No. 05-17-00326, 2018 WL 1790080 (Tex.
App. Apr. 16, 2018).
After members of both parties inherited various royalty and working
interests on a particular lease, Family LP filed suit against Energy
Company, alleging improper payments made by the operator of the wells to
Energy Company. Energy Company filed countersuits alleging breach of
contract and failure to make payments on working interest revenues
received. Family LP filed for summary judgment on the counterclaims,
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and—after an arduous procedural battle and the resolution of a related
suit—eventually nonsuited its original claims against Energy Company.
The trial court ultimately granted Family LP’s motion for summary
judgment on Energy Company’s counterclaims, and Energy Company filed
this appeal. The Texas Court of Appeals held that: (1) because Texas law
does not rescue counterclaims in suits for declaratory judgment if barred, as
a matter of law, by limitations, Energy Company’s motion for summary
judgment on that basis was denied; (2) the record reflected no evidence of a
breach of contract within four years of the filing of the suit at hand, nor any
evidence of a violation of the Joint Operating Agreement in the same time
frame; and (3) Energy Company could not receive equitable relief in the
form of the working interest revenue because Energy Company did no work
“for” Family LP in the relevant time period. For those reasons the court
affirmed the trial court’s judgment against Energy Company on all issues
before it and denied Energy Company recovery of Attorney’s Fees.
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SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS
Federal
D.C. Cir.
Nat’l. Envtl. Dev. Ass’n's Clean Air Project v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 891
F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
Environmental Advocates sued Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”),
seeking review of newly modified regulations of the Clean Air Act (“Act”).
The regulations in controversy related to requirements that operators
responsible for significant sources of pollution acquire a fixed-term permit.
Environmental Advocates argued that EPA’s amendments established
“inconsistent permit criteria” depending on the geographical location of the
operator’s operation. According to Environmental Advocates, the
regulatory amendments were inconsistent with 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a), which
require EPA to implement the Act uniformly nationwide. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held in favor of EPA regarding all
arguments, determining that Environmental Advocate’s focus on the
amendments surviving step one of Chevron was incorrect. The court noted
that the federal statute in question solely addressed delegation-created
inconsistencies instead of judicially created inconsistencies as well. In
accordance with EPA’s position on the issue, the court also held that the
Act allowed for inter-circuit non-acquiescence, as inter-circuit conflicts are
inevitable regarding inconsistent judicial outcomes. Because of this ruling,
federal courts’ ruling against EPA on local or regional issues does not
consequently apply automatically across the nation.
N.D. Alabama
Day, LLC v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., No. 2:16–cv–00429–LSC, 2018 WL
2572750 (N.D. Ala. June 4, 2018).
Landowners brought suit against Pipeline Owner after a pipeline spill
caused damage to Landowners’ property. Landowners brought claims of
trespass, nuisance, wantonness, and negligence, as well as violations of the
Clean Water Act (“CWA”), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (“RCRA”). Pipeline Owner moved for partial summary judgment on
the plaintiffs’ environmental claims and argued that Landowners could not
pursue a claim under the CWA because the spill occurred in 2014, was
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imediately cleaned up, and the CWA only allows a citizen suit for ongoing
violations. The district court agreed with Pipeline Owners and granted their
motion for summary judgment. It found that the CWA claim could not
stand because Pipeline Owners contained the spill and worked for years to
remediate the effects of the spill. Additionally, the court found Landowners
were unable to show that any remaining gasoline vapors presented an
imminent risk to human health in violation of the RCRA, and as a result, it
also granted Pipeline Owners’ motion for summary judgment on
Landowner’s RCRA claim.
E.D. California
AquAlliance v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, No. 1:15–CV–754–LJO–
BAM, 2018 WL 2734923 (E.D. Cal. June 7, 2018).
Water Conservation Agencies (“Agencies”) brought suit against U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation and other agencies (“Bureau”) challenging federal
government’s 10-year water transfer program that moved water from sellers
upstream of the Sacramento/San Joaquin Delta to buyers downstream of the
delta. Agencies claimed that Bureau’s approval of different reports violated
the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the U.S. Endangered
Species Act (“Species Act”). At trial, the district court found that all the
reports challenged contained some unlawful parts within them, and the
court ordered the parties to meet and come up with a proposed schedule for
future proceedings. The parties could agree on whether the court should
vacate he Bureau’s findings or remand without vacatur. Upon review of the
facts, the court determined that, given the assertions of the parties, remand
without vacatur was not justified. Because the court found that the facts
suggested no environmental or other consequences would result from a
vacatur of the reports, it ordered a vacatur of the reports of the Bureau.
N.D. California
Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, No. 16-cv07014-VC, 2018 WL 2210680 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2018).
The City of Oakland (“City”) entered into an agreement with Developer to
build and operate a bulk cargo shipping terminal. Terms of the agreement
stipulated that any regulations adopted by City after the agreement was
entered into would not apply to the subject of the agreement: the shipping
terminal. However, an exception to this stipulation existed. If City
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determined that failure to apply a new regulation would pose a substantial
danger to the health or safety to the people of the city, then the regulation
could apply to the terminal. After the agreement was signed, concerns
throughout the city grew regarding the potential transport of coal through
the terminal. In response, the City Council adopted new regulations banning
coal operations at bulk material facilities, and the new regulation
specifically noted that it applied to the shipping terminal in question.
Developer brought suit against City claiming that City lacked substantial
evidence to conclude that the potential coal operations at the terminal
would pose a substantial health or safety risk to the people of the city, and
thus it was in breach of the agreement. The district court found that while
the substantial evidence standard created by the agreement was highly
deferential to lawmakers, it found that City erred in allowing the new
regulation to apply to the terminal because there was insufficient evidence
before the council made its decision showing the potential coal operations
would pose a substantial health or safety risk. Thus, the court found that the
regulation adopted by City was a breach of the agreement between City and
Developer, and accordingly, City could not restrict Developers coal
operations.
D. Colorado
WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 17–cv–3141–
WJM–STV, 2018 WL 1905145 (D. Colo. Apr. 23, 2018).
Environmental Organization brought suit against Government Agency,
alleging that Government Agency made an illegal decision not to perform a
certain type of analysis under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) in auctioning
particular oil and gas leases. Government Agency found no need to perform
the analysis because (1) its action of leasing would not “directly” cause any
emissions which must fit within the particular standard; and (2) it argued
that future emissions by leaseholders were not reasonably foreseeable. The
district court determined that future emissions would be reasonably
foreseeable if their location was known and they could be quantified and
described and documented by Government Agency using the information in
its possession. The court then laid out what it thought was the best
argument in favor of Environmental Organization but disregarded it
because it was not the one Environmental Organization pursued. The court
found that the burden was on Environmental Organization to prove that
Government Agency “arbitrarily or capriciously” made the decision that the
information in its possession at the time was insufficient to make future
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emissions reasonably foreseeable. Because its arguments did not overcome
the presumption of validity in Government Agency’s favor, the court
affirmed Government Agency’s determination and terminated the case.
D. District of Columbia
Clean Water Action v. Pruitt, No. 17–0817, 2018 WL 1865919 (D.D.C.
Apr. 18, 2018).
Environmental groups (“Groups”) brought suit against Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) challenging the agency’s postponement of a
rule that limited how much toxic metal could be discharged along with the
waste that water power plants create. Groups alleged that EPA failed to
make the appropriate findings in order to have justification to stay the new
rule. At trial, EPA moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that Groups’
claims were moot because the stay on the rule was already withdrawn.
Instead, EPA issued an amendment to the rule and pushed back compliance
dates. The trial court granted EPA’s motion to dismiss. Groups then
motioned the court to allow them to amend their complaint to include
claims challenging the amendment to the rule rather than the stay of the
rule, but the court also denied this request.
S.D. Florida
Cotromano v. United Techs. Corp., No. 10-80840-Civ-Marra, 2018 WL
2047468 (S.D. Fla. May 2, 2018).
Private homeowners (“Homeowners”) brought suit against a rocket and
aerospace testing and manufacturing plant (“Plant”) alleging contamination
of the air, water, and soil of their properties. Homeowners made claims of
contamination or risk of future contamination, loss of use and enjoyment of
property, as well as diminution in value of property. Homeowners filed a
putative class action suit alleging the class suffered over $1 billion in
damages. Landowners motioned to certify its class to the trial court. The
trial court denied Homeowners’ bid to certify the class, finding that the
proposed class area in the residential community was over-inclusive. The
trial court relied on the findings of Homeowners’ experts, all of whom
failed to connect the boundaries of the proposed class to the area at risk of
contamination. Additionally, the court found that Homeowners’ claims
were too individualized to justify a class action. Accordingly, the motion to
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certify the class was denied, and the court ordered the case to proceed on
behalf of individually named Homeowners.
N.D. Illinois
LCCS Grp. v. Lenz Oil Serv. Peoria, Inc., No. 16 C 5827, 2018 WL
1961133 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 2018).
Facility Owner filed suit against Operator under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(“CERCLA”), alleging a release of hazardous substances from Facility
Owner’s facility. Facility Owner’s records showed that Operator’s
predecessor disposed of approximately 133,200 gallons of waste from the
facility prior to Operator’s formation as an entity. Operator filed for
summary judgment, arguing that it was not the same entity as its
predecessor and had no relation to the activities causing the legal matter at
hand, and thus, it could not be held responsible under CERCLA. However,
the court agreed with Facility Owner that there was sufficient evidence to
raise a question as to whether Operator was the legal successor in the matter
of the disposal of the waste and denied Operator’s motion for summary
judgment.
E.D. North Carolina
Save Our Sound OBX, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., No. 2:17–CV–4–FL,
2018 WL 2671207, (E.D.N.C. June 4, 2018).
Non-profit opposition group (“Opposition”) brought suit against the North
Carolina Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway
Administration (“Agencies”) challenging their approval of a 2.8-mile-long
"jug-handle bridge" (“Bridge”) over the Pamlico Sound. Opposition
claimed Agencies approved the Bridge without fully considering
environmental consequences under National Environmental Protection Act
(“NEPA”), the feasible alternatives under the Department of Transportation
Act (“DTA”), or impacts of the Bridge on historically significant property
under the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”). Opposition argued
that Agencies’ approval of the Bridge was predetermined as part of a
settlement agreement in which Agencies agreed to sign off on the Bridge in
exchange for conservation groups dropping a lawsuit challenging the
construction of another bridge that is part of the reconstruction of the entire
highway. The district court found for Agencies, finding that Agencies
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complied with the NEPA and other federal laws when approving a bridge in
the Outer Banks. The court rejected Opposition’s claims of a settlement
agreement predetermining Agencies’ approval of the bridge.
S.D. West Virginia
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Fola Coal Co., LLC, No. 2:17-3013, 2018 WL
1833215 (S.D.W. Va. Apr. 17, 2018).
Environmental groups (“Groups”) brought suit against Coal Company for
violations of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act (collectively “Acts”). Groups alleged that
Coal Company improperly discharged pollutants from its mines into nearby
waters. Coal Company moved to have the claims dismissed on the grounds
that Groups’ claims were barred because res judicata precluded them. Coal
Company asserted that two previous suits brought against them challenging
their discharges into nearby streams were the same allegations as the claims
brought by Groups and were thus barred by res judicata. The claims in the
previous suits against Coal Company challenged the discharge of selenium
into nearby water. In the present case, Groups specifically challenged the
discharge of ionic chemicals. Because of this, the court disagreed with Coal
Company and instead found that the causes of action brought by Groups
were different from the previous suits and had different transactional nuclei.
As such, res judicata did not bar Groups’ claims.
State
California
Save Adelaida v. Cty. of San Luis Obispo, 2d Civ. No. B279285, 2018 WL
2439874 (Cal. Ct. App. June 20, 2018).
Olive Orchard Owner (“Owner”) applied to the County of San Luis Obispo
(“County”) for a minor use permit to hold events on its property. Owner
planned to construct a 300-square-foot agricultural building for olive oil
and wine processing. After reviewing the permit request, County issued a
mitigated negative declaration (“MND”) granting the permit. Neighbors
argued an MND was not sufficient and that environmental impact report
(“EIR”) was required. The trial court found that an EIR was in fact
necessary in order to analyze the impact of the project on traffic, noise,
water use, etc. However, the court also determined that an EIR was not
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necessary to analyze the project’s use of wastewater or compliance with the
county’s land use ordinance. Both parties appealed. On appeal the
California Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decision and held that
an EIR was required to analyze wastewater after finding discrepancies in
the MND and statements by Owner’s staff regarding the waste water.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
World Bus. Acad. v. Cal. State Lands Comm’n, No. B284300, 2018 WL
2948667 (Cal. Ct. App. June 13, 2018).
Environmentalist challenged the decision of state lands commission
(“Commission”) to extend a lease to Power Company for state owned
submerged and tidal lands of the Pacific Ocean. The lease was used for the
placement of water intake and discharge structures used in Power
Company’s nuclear plant cooling systems. Prior to approval of the lease
extension, Commission did not prepare an environmental impact report, as
required by the California Environmental Quality Act (“Act”), as it
considered the extension to be an exemption to the Act’s requirement as an
“existing facilities” categorial exemption. Environmentalist claimed that the
exception was not applicable in this instance, and if it by chance was, it was
subject to the “unusual circumstances” exception to the exception. At trial,
the court rejected Environmentalist’s claims and found that Commission’s
extension of the lease was proper. Environmentalist contended that the
exception, with respect to power companies, only applied to structures that
transmitted power, not to those that generated or provided power. On
appeal, the Court of Appeal of California disagreed with Environmentalist
and found that the exception had been properly applied. The court also
addressed the alleged exception to the exception. However, the court again
agreed with the lower court’s finding that Commission properly examined
whether the unusual circumstances exception applied. The court analyzed
various factors used to determine whether the lease extension would have a
significant impact on the environment or the possibility of a significant
impact. After reviewing Commission’s analysis of the lease extension, the
court found that it was proper. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s
ruling that the lease extension did not require an environmental impact
report as normally required by the Act.
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Pennsylvania
Gorsline v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfield, No. 67 MAP 2016, 2018 WL
2448803 (Pa. June 1, 2018).
Company appealed after the lower court reversed Board’s denial of
Company’s development of natural gas wells in a district zoned
“Residential-Agricultural.” The ordinance at issue held that when a use is
not specifically permitted or denied, a use is approved by the board only if
“it is similar to and compatible with the other uses permitted in the zone”
and “is in no way in conflict with the general purposes” of the ordinance.
The lower court held that drilling operations are “similar to” the
Residential-Agricultural purposes in the ordinance. On appeal, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that oil and gas drilling operations are
not “similar to” the uses permitted in the ordinance. The court explained
that Board was free to make amendments to the ordinance in order to allow
for those types of activities, but the language of the statute, as written, did
not permit those types of activities.
Friends of Lackawanna v. Dunmore Borough Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 656
C.D. 20172018 WL 2089812 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 7, 2018).
Company owned Landfill, and in 2014, Company submitted an application,
which was later approved, with Zoning Board to modify its existing permit
and expand its usage of the land for waste management purposes. County
Advocate objected and appealed to Zoning Board, alleging that the landfill
constituted a structure under the City Zoning Ordinance, and therefore, the
proposed new height of the landfill would exceed a relevant local
ordinance’s height restrictions. County Advocate was offered an
opportunity to present testimony and evidence of its case at multiple board
hearings thereafter, despite objection from Company. After multiple
hearings filled with many testimonials, Zoning Board determined that
County Advocate lacked standing to appeal Zoning Board’s decision and
affirmed its original decision to approve the application. Zoning Board
reasoned that County Advocate was not a landowner abutting the landfill,
and thus, lacked a pecuniary interest in the matter. County Advocate
appealed to the trial court, to which Keystone responded with a motion to
dismiss. The trial court heard the matter anyway and determined that
Zoning Board was correct in its determination that County Advocate failed
to demonstrate a substantial interest in the landfill expansion. On appeal,
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania determined that County
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Advocate’s group of homeowners did have a substantial interest in the
matter and that County Advocate’s position as namesake of the group of
homeowners did not forego that interest.
Washington
State v. Montlake LLC, No. 77359–3–I, 2018 WL 2041518 (Wash. Ct. App.
Apr. 30, 2018).
State Department of Transportation (“DOT”) was instructed by legislature
to build several “mega-Projects” within the state. One of the projects
included the replacement of a floating bridge across Lake Washington. In
order to complete this project, DOT needed to condemn three lots located in
a commercial district near the Lake. DOT published an Environmental
Impact Statement (“EIS”) for the project and then brought suit against
Landowners of the three lots to condemn the properties. After a hearing, the
trial court granted DOT’s public use and necessity claim for condemnation,
as well as two related orders addressing environmental and administration
issues. Landowners and Lessees appealed all three orders. On appeal the
Washington Court of Appeals found that the evidence substantially
supported the trial court’s finding that DOT’s condemnation decision was
not arbitrary and capricious and that substantial evidence supported the
findings that condemnation of the properties was necessary to complete the
project. Additionally, the court rejected Landowners’ argument that the
Secretary of DOT improperly redelegated his condemnation authority to
Program Administrator, citing a lack of evidence to support such
allegations.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
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